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The hypothesis that megafauna extinction some 10,000 years ago was 
due to "overkill" by Paleolithic hunters is examined using an economic 
model of a replenishable resource. The large herding animals that 
became extinct, such as mammoth, bison, camel, and mastodon, pre­
sented low-hunting cost and high kill value. The absence of appropriation 
provided incentives for the wastage killing evident in some kill sites, 
while the slow growth, long lives, and long maturation of large animals 
increased their vulnerability to extinction. Free-access hunting is com­
pared with socially optimal hunting and used to interpret the develop­
ment of conservationist ethics, and controls, in more recent primitive 
cultures. 
1. Introduction 
Many archaeologists and other scientists believe that the available 
evidence supports the hypothesis-startling to nonspecialists-that the 
unusual incidence of large-animal extinctions throughout the world 
during the late Pleistocene period was caused, to an important extent, 
by Paleolithic hunters. Even· if true, the extinction of large animals is 
but one of the more dramatic examples of the very substantial impact 
that primitive as well as modern man has had on his "natural" environ­
ment (Heizer 1955). The purpose of this essay is threefold: ( 1) to acquaint 
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economists with some of the evidence and hypotheses from other sciences 
concerning the role of primitive man as hunter par excellence, (2) to 
parameterize some important features of these observations and hypoth­
eses in the context of a model of the primitive hunter culture which, in 
the face of animal extinctions, turns increasingly to agriculture, and 
(3) to attempt to demonstrate to archaeologists and other scientists the 
potential that economic analysis may have in unifying and integrating 
this body of evidence and conjecture. In what follows, the reader should 
bear in mind that much of the "evidence" to which reference will be 
made is subject to dispute; certainly the interpretation of that evidence 
is controversial. 
It is my belief, in reading the archaeological literature in this area, 
that there is a natural economic rationale for ''overkill" as a possible 
explanation for the large-animal extinctions which has not been ade­
quately or fully articulated. Briefly stated, the large extinct herbivores 
hunted by primitive men, such as the mammoth and bison, were 
gregarious herd animals, easily located, and apparently easily approached 
and struck with crude missile weapons or stampeded into "jumps." 
Multiple kills were therefore likely, but because of their large size, even 
a single kill represented high value. The combination of low hunting 
cost and high value would make large animals the most economical prey. 
Furthermore, in the absence of appropriation or other incentives for the 
individual hunter to attach value to the live animal stock, wastage killing 
was possibly commonplace. Biologically, the larger genera of animals are 
characterized by slow growth, long lives, and long periods of maturation, 
and are therefore the most vulnerable to hunting pressure. That is, the 
hunter harvest is more likely to exceed net biological growth, causing a 
decline in biomass. 
In Section 2, some of the facts, conjectures, and interpretations of late 
Pleistocene extinctions are summarized. In Section 3, a particularly 
simple form of existing models of production from common-property 
replenishable resources is used to stylize the hunter-agrarian economy. 
This permits a comparative-statics treatment of the effect of prey size, 
vulnerability, and value, and of predator technology and population, on 
prey biomass and extinction potential (Section 4). Socially optimal 
hunting is modeled in Sections 5 and 6 and the Appendix, on the assump­
tion that institutional mechanisms of control (property-right systems or 
cultural or legal constraints that internalize the social costs of individual 
hunter actions) are adequate to support the optimal sustained-yield 
harvesting of prey. These optimal patterns are compared with free­
access hunting. This analysis is used to develop the conditions under 
which it may be optimal to "conserve" or, alternatively, to destroy a 
hunted species and to compare such cases with the corresponding free­
access solutions. 
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2. The Hypotheses of Pleistocene Extinction 
One of the great scientific puzzles studied extensively by archaeologists, 
paleontologists, and geologists is the cause and process of the unprece­
dented wave of large-animal extinction in the late Pleistocene period. 
Martin (1967, pp. 75, 82-86) suggests the loss of over 200 genera world­
wide and lists 80 late Pleistocene extinct animals in continental North 
America of which 49 had an average adult body weight 'in excess of 
110 pounds (the "megafauna"). These megafauna included camels, 
horses, bison, mastodons, llamas, ground sloths (including a giant the 
size of an elephant), mammoths (the largest, Mammuthus impeirator, was 
13 feet tall and considerably larger than the African elephant), beavers, 
short-faced bears, armadillos, several saber-tooth cats (including Smilodon, 
the tiger), shrub oxen, moose, tapirs, antelope, and many more. Of the 
49 genera in the late Pleistocene, 33 became extinct at a time which 
could have roughly coincided with the arrival of the Paleo-Indians in 
North America. Of the 31 smaller extinct mammals listed by Martin, 
only one could have been associated with man. Those terminal Pleistocene 
megafauna apparently found in "direct association" with man include 
ground sloths, camels, mastodons, horses, mammoths, shrub oxen, tapirs, 
and the extinct bi.Son. Evidence of human predation is clearest in the 
case of mammoth and extinct bison. That Clovis fluted-point hunters 
killed mammoth around 11,000 years ago is hardly open to question, and 
sometime later, perhaps after the sudden disappearance of the mammoth, 
the Folsom point was developed and used to kill now-extinct bison 
(Haynes 1964). The Clovis, Folsom, and subsequent Scottsbluff point 
projectile technologies seem specifically designed for big-game hunting. 
Although accelerated extinctions had occurred in periods earlier than 
the late Pleistocene, they had affected marine organisms, plants, and the 
smaller mammals as well as the larger mammals. Furthermore, the 
pattern of worldwide extinction of the larger mammals seems suspiciously 
to correlate with the migration chronology of man. This has led Martin 
(also see Sauer 1944) to the hypothesis that Pleistocene extinction was 
due to overkill by Paleolithic hunters armed with the stone-tipped spear, 
fire, and the communal hunting party. Martin (1967, p. 75) states: 
Except on islands where smaller animals disappeared, extinc­
tion struck only the large terrestrial herbivores, their ecologically 
dependent carnivores, and their scavengers. Although it may 
have occurred during times of climatic change, the event is not 
clearly related to climatic change. One must seek another cause. 
Extinction closely follows the chronology of prehistoric man's 
spread and his development as a big-game hunter. No con­
tinents or islands are known in which accelerated extinction 
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definitely predates man's arrival. The phe
nomenon of overkill 
alone explains the global extinction pattern
. 
A scenario built around this hypothesis 
goes as follows: For 200,000 
years prior to the arrival of man, the larg
e herbivores of North America 
were increasing in diversity and experienc
ed no shrinkage of range. They 
evolved and survived over tens of millio
ns of years in the presence of 
numerous environmental changes and p
redators. Several genera had 
emigrated over the Bering land bridge to
 the hospitable environment of 
North America. Consequently, the Nort
h America of 15,000 years ago 
was comparable to nineteenth-century
 Africa in terms of the huge,
strange, "unlikely" beasts that grazed the
 plains and browsed the forests 
and brush. Then, approximately 12,000
 years ago, the first Paleolithic 
men, ancestors of many of the present-d
ay Indians, arrived across the 
exposed Bering land bridge. They were h
unters, perhaps driven to wider 
migration by the dwindling herds of prey
 in Eurasia. They brought with 
them the culture, skill, and technology o
f big-game hunting-the spear, 
perhaps the atlatl (spear thrower), fire,
 and stone projectile points. At 
some time in this migration, they develo
ped the Clovis fluted point-a 
work of craftsmanship in stone carefully ad
apted to the demands of killing 
large animals. These hunters preyed on 
gregarious herds of mammoth, 
bison, and perhaps mastodon, camels, ta
pirs, horses, and other animals 
which were easy to locate and probably
 showed little fear of the new 
predators. By 11,000 years ago, this efficie
nt new predator had wiped out 
the mammoth and was concentrating on
 now-extinct species of bison. 
The bison may have been killed by ju
mps (as was common within 
historic times by Indians) and perhaps fi
re drives, and by this time the 
Clovis point was giving way to the Fols
om projectile point. The pop­
ulation of Paleo-Indians expanded rap
idly across North and South 
America, appearing at the southern tip of 
South America by 10,000 years 
ago, and, one may conjecture, lived affluen
tly for as long as the game was 
plentiful. As the herds disappeared, thei
r predators, the saber-toothed 
tiger, dire wolf, and hyena, became extin
ct. Hunting effort was directed 
at smaller, less vulnerable game which 
produced a relatively meager 
existence and was eventually replaced by
 an agricultural technology in 
which subsistence depended on crops o
f corn (and later beans and 
squash) supplemented with small game. 
The scenario is plausible but is by no mea
ns an established fact. That
man arrived about 12,000 years ago is proba
ble, as there is no firm radio­
carbon dating of any earlier evidence of m
an (Haynes 1967). That man 
hunted mammoth and, later, two species o
f now-extinct bison is surely a 
certainty based on documented kill sites (Ha
ury, Antevs, and Lance 1953; 
Gross 1951; Agogino and Frankforte' 196
0; Leonhardy 1966).
1 Hester 
1 This is conjecture on my part, but it seem
s plausible that the Bering land bridge 
might have acted as a filter through which only the mo
st able hunting tribes could have 
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and Wendorf (1962, pp. 166-67) report that the most common hunting 
pattern for both mammoth and bison was to stalk and kill animals while 
they were drinking in a pond or stream. Killing occurred by means of 
spears aimed at the thoracic region, although in one site, the presence of 
boulders suggests they were used to kill wounded mammoth. A second 
pattern was the stampede, probably present in three kill sites of early man. 
The animals (extinct bison) were driven into a stream or over a cliff, 
sometimes in numbers as high as several hundred. At the Olsen-Chubbuck 
site in Colorado, well-preserved and carefully excavated remains of bones 
and artifacts prove that about 8,500 years ago some 200 Bison occidentalis 
were stampeded into an arroyo only 5-7 feet deep. The injured animals 
were killed by projectile points generally of the Scottsbluff type. About 
75 percent of the animals were then systematically butchered (Wheat 
1967). The killing of bison in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries by 
stampeding them over carefully selected ''jumps'' is quite well established 
(Kehoe 1967; Butler 1971). 
Whether the early Americans stampeded animals by fire drives is not 
known, nor is it critical to the overkill hypothesis. The first accounlt of the 
southwestern Indians, by Cabeza de Vaca, records that the inhabitants 
of what is now southwest Texas burned favorable animal ranges in order 
to deprive the animals of forage and force them to frequent areas where 
they could be more easily hunted (Covey 1961, p. 81; cited by Jelinek 
1967, p. 197). Burning of this type (and there is abundant evidence for 
the occurrence of fires in association with man) could have been a more 
effective means by which man contributed to Pleistocene extinction than 
by the occasional fire drive. In the case of herd animals such as Bison that 
are easily stampeded, it is not clear that fire drives were even functional 
unless it was to ensure that the confused animals would not stampede in 
the wrong direction t 
That the mammoth was gone by 10,000-11,000 years ago is also likely, 
based on radiocarbon dating. That there existed a big-game hunting 
tradition is also clearly established by the widespread occurrence of the 
Clovis projectile point type. It is found from Florida to Nova Scotia, in 
the high plains, the Southwest, across the Midwest, and in the South. 
It was a large projectile, 7-15 centimeters long and 3-4 centimeters 
wide. Bases were concave, and a fluting or channeling extended from the 
base up to one-half the length of the point. They were flaked by percussion 
and the base edges ground down to prevent cutting of the thongs that 
passed. The bridge would not have been a suitable viaduct for a gatherer culture, 
"because no likely food sources but game existed for most of the year in the tundra areas 
they traversed" (Jelinek 1967, p. 195). Hence, the early North Americans may have 
been the product of a selection process that favored only the most mobile, skilled, and 
dedicated hunters. This could help explain why megafauna extinction in North AJnerica 
was more rapid than in Europe, Asia, and Africa. 
'.:; ·;_;�; ... �:_:,_;_:,,;;;-""-""=·G)_q;;w,;�------------
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secured them to the spear shaft. 2 Early American points were probably
too heavy, large, and ill-designed for arrow tips. Spears, thrust or thrown 
as a javelin, or darts-perhaps propelled by the atlatl-were the main 
tool of the hunt. Clovis points date back to 12,000 years ago and appar­
ently evolved into the Folsom. The Folsom point dates from about 
1 0,000-1 l,000 years ago and is much less widely dispersed than the 
Clovis. The Folsom point is more delicately made, with fine-edge flaking, 
and is associated with the hunting of the extinct Bison antiquus. The 
Scottsbluff and several similar points date from about 9,000 years ago 
and are associated with the killing of the slightly smaller extinct Bison 
occidentalis. By 7,000-10,000 years ago, projectile points had been adapted 
to the killing of modern smaller game such as sheep, the so-called 
American bison, deer, and antelope. A primitive maize, perhaps in the 
early stages of domestication, has been dated by radiocarbon to around 
5,000-6,000 years ago (Mangelsdorf and Smith 1949). 
Until recently, the commonly accepted cause of late Pleistocene 
extinctions was climatic change and a reduction in grassland areas. This 
view probably still predominates. Thus, according to Guilday (1967, 
p. 12 1), "the fact that the late Pleistocene extinctions were so widespread
and geographically almost simultaneous does call for a major overlying 
cause, however. I suggest that the prime mover was post-Pleistocene 
desiccation. Evidence for such an episode is present on all continents, and 
its effects would have been both swift and lethal. It may have been the 
spur to turn man from hunting to a life centered around animal husbandry 
and agriculture." This states the climatic as against the "overkill" 
extinction hypothesis. The desiccation referred to is associated with a 
drier climate following recession of the last great ice sheet. 3 A variant of 
the climate hypothesis attributes extinction to the effect of more severe 
seasonal fluctuations (colder winters, warmer summers) on those mammals 
with longer gestation periods (Slaughter 1967). But here we have an 
identification problem, for it is the mammals with longer gestation 
periods, longer periods of maternal care, and longer lives that are most 
vulnerable to hunting pressure. 
2 Jelinek (1967, p. 196) notes the significance of this design technology' for the hypoth­
esis of a vulnerable fauna {mammoth): "Grinding would prevent the edges of the point 
from cutting the lashing that bound it to a shaft if the point was subjected to repeated 
lateral stress" as would occur "in a point on a thrusting spear or lance whose shaft 
remained in the hand of the hunter after it penetrated the animal-a technique that 
would be most effective against a relatively easy quarry and of little use against a skittish 
and fearful prey," 
3 However, desiccation followed the three previous glaciation periods and in one 
instance was probably more severe. "Recent pollen evidence from western America 
seems to indicate that in at least some areas occupied by the extinct fauna the conditions 
following the retreat of an earlier glaciation {Illinoian) were probably more arid and as 
warm or warmer than at present. Thus conditions of temperature and aridity do not 
appear likely as direct causes of extinction" (Jelinek 1967, p. 194). 
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733 Finally, of course, there is the multiple-cause, or combination, hypoth­esis, here defined by Hester ( 1967, p. 170): "I take the view that Pleisto­cene man could not have caused the extinction of the North American megafauna until after natural causes had greatly reduced the population of each species." However, Hester's study of historical extinction ( extinc­tion or near extinction of species since European settlement) in North America lists (1) hunting by primitive man and (2) hunting by civilized man with firearms as the first and second major factors in order of frequency. 
Much of the earlier skepticism surrounding the "overkill" hypothesis stems from a disbelief (to some extent perhaps a romantic disbelief) in the ability of primitive men to accomplish, with primitive instruments, the destruction of such huge creatures, already the prey of the formidable saber�toothed tiger and dire wolf. Yet these men were not genetically, in terms of intelligence and skill capacity, that different from modern man. Also, modern studies of predation by the timber wolf on Isle Royale indicate that moose stock may be strengthened by the killing of old, weak, and diseased animals (Mech 1970). The large kill sites of mammoth and bison suggest wastage-killing beyond immediate butchering require­ments-so that there is some reason to believe that man was orders of magnitude more effective in predation than his animal competitors. Overfishing in historic times is well known. The d�mise of great whales (and recently the Alaskan king crab) is well known, and the capacity of man for wholesale rivalrous killing, even with the most primitive of we�pons, is dramatically documented in the following Palo Alto Times (March 13, 1973) account: 
In the course of a few hours early Sunday a shoal of 637 pilot whales were driven into a narrow f jord on the island of Vaga (Faeroe Islands, Denmark) by stone-throwing islanders in an armada of small boats. Then they were slaughtered with long spears and knives in a gruesome spectacle that has been part of Faeroese life for centuries. The whales churned their tails furiously in shallow water . . . The shoal of whales was one of the biggest since more than 2000 pilot whales were killed in one day east of here 20 years ago. 
Some time between 12,000 and 3,000 years ago the early Americans turned from an exclusively hunting and gathering culture to one based more and more on agriculture. I assume that men found it to their economic advantage to make this change. It is perhaps significant to the overkill hypothesis that man did not turn from big game to smaller game except as a supplement to agriculture, as a result of the large-animal extinctions. Even the plentiful American bison apparently was hunted only incidentally until after the introduction of riding horses by the 
.:,..._,._..,.���":;�C"'"""'�Z'""""""""'--------------
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Spanish in historic times. 4 It may have been the case that only the largest 
herding animals were economical to hunt with the tools of Paleolithic man. 
Perhaps the weakest element in the overkill hypothesis is the scant 
direct evidence that early North Americans hunted extensively any of 
the extinct animals other than mammoth and bison. 5 Extinct horse, 
camel, tapir, mastodon, and antelope have been found in mammoth and 
bison kill sites but not so as to clearly demonstrate death by the spear6 (or 
other means attributable to paleohunters). At the· Lehner Ranch site in 
Arizona (Haury, Sayles, and Wasley 1959) nine mammoths and at least 
one each of horse, bison, and tapir occur in a single bone bed. Directly 
associated with these bones was evidence of man's destruction of at least 
some of the animals. Thus, Clovis spear points were found in situ among 
ribs of a mammoth and a bison, However, Irwin-Williams (1967, p, 346) 
reports that at a kill site near Puebla, Mexico, "the character of the 
assemblage (bones and projectile points) indicates hunting and butchering 
activities involving mastodon, mammoth, horse, camel, four�horned 
antelope, etc." But the fact that such evidence is not firm or more wide� 
spread is puzzling in view of the fact that there is much evidence for the 
hunting of the horse as we�l as mammoth at an earlier date in Europe. 
Sites such as Solutre in France contain the remains of an estimated 
100,000 horses (MacCurdy 1933, p, 173; cited by Jelinek 1967, p. 195), 
But for the purposes of this paper, it is enough to assume that the earliest 
Americans subsisted primarily on mammoth and bison, turning to 
gathering, agriculture, and supplemental game as these animals became 
extinct. 
The abandonment of agriculture and the return to the hunting of 
4 'When the horse was reintroduced to the New World by the Spanish in the sixteenth 
century, Equus had been extinct throughout the Americas for only about 8,000 years. 
In North America horse bones are among the most common Pleistocene fossils (Martin 
and Guilday 1967, pp. 41-42)- Upon reintroduction, the horse reproduced and spread 
rapidly and thrives today i n  the wild, as does the burro, under extremely arid conditions 
in Nevada, Arizona, and Utah. This development makes it the more puzzling that late 
Pleistocene extinction of the horse would have been due to desiccation. 
5 The survival of African megafauna is often cited as negative evidence for the overkill 
hypothesis. But this view has been challenged by several writers. Martin (1967, pp. 
110-11) notes that some 50 genera (about 30 percent) disappeared in Africa during the 
Pleistocene. Most of this extinction occurred before 40,000-50,000 years ago and "seems 
to coincide with the maximum development of the most advanced early Stone Age 
hunting cultures .. - . The case of Africa neither refutes the hypothesis of overkill nor 
supports the hypothesis of worldwide climatic change as a cause of extinction." Jelinek 
(1967, p. 194) also suggests that Africa is not comparable to those areas of the northern 
hemisphere where extinction occurred, because the African flora was more favorable 
for gathering. Thus, gathering may have been sufficiently economical to have reduced 
the hunting stress to which the African megafauna was exposed. 
6 Martin (1973, pp. 969-74) explained the absence of kill sites for horse, camel, and 
ground sloths by the hypothesis that they were killed too quickly and easily to leave 
extensive fossil traces. The idea is that vulnerability to overkill and archaeological 
visibility are inversely related. 
' 
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735 bison by some American Indian groups in historic times (seventeenth and eighteenth centuries) is well established. According to Wedel (1936), "the introduction of the horse deeply affected the Pawnee, as it did most of the plains tribes , , . [leading to] the tendency toward a nomadic, bison-hunting mode of life made possible by the horse . . .. From a sedentary tribe the Pawnee became one in which the chase and maize culture shared almost equally. '' 
The more revolutionary effect of the horse on the "fighting Cheyenne"of the northern plains is reported by Strong (1940, pp. 359, 370, 375-76). Wedel (1940, p. 327) reports that the Cheyenne and Arapahoe abandonedtheir villages, pottery arts, and horticulture to become bison hunters,while the Plains Apache (already subsisting on bison herds in 1541 as reported by the Spanish explorer Coronado) merely adapted the horseto a preexisting bison culture. Apparently, the vast encampments withlarge tepees of bison hide familiar to later European settlers depended on a substantial increase in the bison harvest made possible by the riding horse. 
3. A Model of the Primitive Hunter-Agrarian Economy 
I have characterized the Paleo-Indian as a big-game hunter who turnedto agriculture as his chief prey became extinct but whose descendantsreturned to a more nomadic hunting economy after the introduction ofthe riding horse. This stark representation will be stylized in an economic model of subsistence based on fr:ee-access hunting and/or agriculture inwhich the biomass of game is determined by biological growth con­siderations that are autonomous but are affected by the harvest product of the hunt. 
Consider an economy of population n, each member of which is free to engage in hunting or agriculture 7 as a productive activity. Hunting activity is applied to a single homogeneous species of biomass, M, such asmastodon, mammoth, or bison, and yields a per capita output of "l perunit of time. Agricultural activity is applied to the production of a single homogeneous crop, such as corn or beans, and yields a per capita output of c per unit of time. Then H units of hunting labor per capita, and A units of agricultural labor per capita, are employed, with L = H + A, the total per capita labor available. The production function for corn is c = g(yA) and for meat m = f(PH, M/ n) ; in which it is assumed thatincreasing the stock of game and of hunters by the same proportion has no effect on the per capita output of meat. The parameters fJ and y are efficiency parameters for labor in hunting and farming, respectively. 7 I shall refer to the alternative to hunting as "agriculture," but it could just as well be gathering. To the early North Americans, the only viable alternative to hunting prior to 5,000-6,000 years ago \o\'Ould seem to have been gathering. 
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Thus, an increase in f3 incr
eases the hunting efficiency 
of labor. The 
effect of a technological chan
ge in weapons, or the introdu
ction of the 
horse into the Plains Indian 
culture, is assumed to be cap
tured by an 
appropriate increase in f3. 
It will be understood, without
 always making it explicit, tha
t all of the 
variables are dated, that is, M
 = M (t), H = H(t), and so 
on with n, 
L, f3, and y given constants. 
The hun�ed resource is assum
ed to be subject to a biologic
al growth 
law (see, e.g., Lotka 1956; S
mith 1968; Plourde 1971), w
hich, in the 
absence of predation by man,
 is given by M'(t) = F[M(t)
]. It will be 
assumed that F (M) can be 
written in the form F(M) =
 kG(M), 
k > 0, G " (M) < 0, M :<: O; G ' (M0) =
 0, G (M) :<: 0, 0,,; M,,; M, 
where M is the maximum naturally susta
inable stock of the hunted 
biomass (see fig. I). The parameter k expresse
s the biotic growth potential 
and therefore the predator vul
nerability of the species in the
 sense that 
an increase in k increases the g
rowth rate of the stock for 0 <
 M < M 
but does not increase the natu
ral equilibrium stock, M. It may be sup­
posed that a great many factors
 influence k .  A change in clima
te affecting 
reproduction, infection by disea
se, or a change in food availabi
lity would 
alter k for a given genus. Amo
ng different genera, k would 
vary with 
growth characteristics such a
s feeding habits, energy req
uirements, 
gestation period, age of matu
ration, life span, and efficien
cy of food 
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conversion. Generally, the larger genera of mammals are slower growing, 
have longer gestation periods, require longer periods of maternal care, 
and live longer. These factors spell greater vulnerability to hunting 
pressure in that a given tonnage reduction in biomass will require longer 
to regenerate. In this regard, the modern forms of those extinct species 
hunted by or found in association with primitive man have relatively 
long lives (and gestation periods): llama, 20 years (10---11 months 
gestation); camel, 45 years ( 10-14 months); horse, 25-30 years ( 11-12 
months); elephant, 60�0 years (22 months); and bison, 18--22 years 
(9 months). It is perhaps significant that the American bison (Bison bison) 
familiar to nineteenth-century European settlers dates no further back 
than Paleo-Indian times and is believed to represent a dwarfed form 
of the extinct Bison occidentalis (Edwards 1967). Also, mammoth kill sites 
commonly contain the remains of the giants of the species (Mammuthus 
imperator , 4.0 m high; Mammuthus columbi , 3.6 m high), both larger than 
the largest African elephant (3.52 m high) (Martin and Guilday 1967). 
On the matter of size, age of maturity, and speed of growth, Hammond 
(1961, p. 321) observes that a considerable reduction in size has occurred 
over the last 50 years in the major beef breeds of cattle due to deliberate 
selection for early maturation in body proportions. Hence, under common­
property conditions we have Paleolithic hunters selectively harvesting the 
larger, slower-growing mammals due to emphasis on consuming the stock. 
But under appropriation with domesticated animals and emphasis on 
sustained-yield harvesting, investment favors the smaller, earlier-maturing 
animals which provide a higher biomass growth rate. 
When each member of a population of size n applies H units of labor 
to hunting, this yields a harvest of nm = nf (/3H, M/n) units of the 
replenishable resource, and the net growth rate of the resource is given by 
M'(t) = F(M) - nf(/JH, M/n). (I) 
Each of n individuals is assumed to choose (H, A) so as to maximize a 
utility function u(c ,  m) subject to L = H + A and the above production 
constraints. By substituting c = g[y(L - H)] and m = f(/3H, M/n), 
the problem can be expressed 
max u{g[y(L - H)], f(/JH, M/n)). 
H 
If u(g, f) is concave in H for given M, an interior maximum is defined 
by the condition 
- u 1yg' + u2f3f1 = 0, O < H < L. (2) 
Equation (2), requiring the marginal rate of transformation between corn 
and meat to be equal to their marginal rate of substitution, can be 
regarded as determining an economic equilibrium between H and M. 
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That is, for each resource stock, M, there is a corresponding eco
nomical 
expenditure of hunting labor so that ( l )  and (2) together deter
mine a
differential equation in M'(t) and M(t) only. An illustrative sol
ution to 
( l) and (2) is shown graphically in figure l .  The curve at the
 bottom 
of figure 1 represents growth in the biomass of the hunted reso
urce net 
of harvested units. The equilibrium harvest function, nf(/3H, 
M/n), is 
shown intersecting the growth function, F(M), at two points M"' 
and Ms, 
both of which satisfy (I) and (2) when M'(t) = 0. Stability in the
 
neighborhood of a point M' where M'(t) = 0 requires dM
'/dM < 0. 
Differentiating ( l )  and (2), one can easily verify that the sign of
 dM' /dM 
is ambiguous, even where F'(M) < 0, given only the concav
ity of u ,  J, 
and g. In the illustration of figure l ,  point M' is shown as loc
ally stable 
while Mu is not. 
More specific results will be derived and illustrated graphicall
y, while 
those parameters essential to the subsequent applications of t
he model 
are retained, by introducing the following simplifying assumption
s: 
1. u(c, m) = c + vm, u1 = 1, 
u2 = v. Corn and meat are perfect 
substitutes, and value is measured in subjective com-equivale
nt units. 
The parameter vis the society's subjective value of meat relative
 to corn. 
Thus, u is the per capita income (welfare) of the society. 
2. f (j3H, M/n) and g[y(L - H)] are increasing, concav
e, and 
homogeneous of degree l ,  with f (0, M) = f (j3H, 0) = g
(O) = 0. 
Hence, letting x = j3Hn/ M be hunting intensity, that is, tota
l hunting 
labor per unit biomass, we can write 
j (j3H, M/n) (M/n)¢(x), ¢' > 0, ¢" < 0, ¢(0)
 = 0,
j1 = </>'(x) > 0
, j2 = ¢ - x¢' > 0, 
g[y(L - H)] = y(L - H), g' = l .
Applying these assumptions, (2) becomes j3v¢'(x) = y, or 
j3�n = .p-<-O (y�) = .p-<-1>(r/v), (3) 
where r is a relative efficiency parameter, that is, the efficiency of 
labor 
in agriculture relative to hunting, and r/v is the real wage or the oppo
r� 
tunity cost of hunting (the value of the corn forgone) .  Under 
these 
assumptions, ( 1) becomes 
M'(t) = F(M) - M¢[¢-<-1>(r/v)]. (4) 
At an equilibrium point, M*, 
M'(t) = F(M*) - M*</>[¢-<-O(r/v)] = 0, (5) 
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and the stability condition, near M*, is 
dM' = F'(M*) - ¢[.p-<-1>(r/v)] < 0.dM (6) 
Equilibrium can also be expressed as occurring at M* where the average 
biological growth rate, a(M*; k), is equal to the harvest intensity (output 
per unit biomass), ¢. That is, rewriting (5) and substituting F(M) = 
kG(M), 
kG(M*) "'a(M*; k) = ¢[¢'(-Il(r/v)]. (7) M* 
4, Comparative Statics of Hunting 
The marginal effect of any of the parameters k, v, n ,  and p on equilibrium 
hunting effort, H*, and equilibrium biomass, M*, can be deduced by 
differentiating (3) and (7). By differentiating u• = y(L - H*) + 
(vM* /n)</>(x*), the effect of such parameters on equilibrium per capita 
income can also be ascertained. In determining such effects, any factor 
which reduces the equilibrium stock of the resource may also, in the 
limiting case, produce extinction (see Gould [1972] and Clarke [1973] 
for analyses of extinction).  From (7), it is clear that extinction of a species 
due to hunting pressure will occur if a(O; k) < ¢[.p-<-O(r/v)], that is, 
if rjv < ¢'{¢-1[a(O; k)}. It follows that unless ¢(x) has an upper bound 
below a(O; k) there is always a real wage rate small enough (i.e., a return 
on agricultural labor that is small enough) to produce extinction. 
The effect of changes in the indicated parameters on (M*, H*, u*) 
is summarized below: 
l .  dM* a - = -- > 0 
dk ka' ' 
dH* H* dM* --= - -- > 0  dk M* dk ' 
du* dM* -= (v /n)(</> - x¢') - > 0, dk dk 
where a' = [oa(M*; k)]/iJM* < 0. Consequently, if larger animal 
species have a lower biotic growth potential (i.e., smaller k), this will 
tend to (i) reduce the equilibrium stock (and increase the possibility of 
extinction), (ii) encourage agricultural effort at the expense of hunting, 
and (iii) decrease per capita income. 
2. dM* (</>')' - = --- < 0dj3 a'¢" j3 ' dH* = H* dM" M*</>' H* d/3 M* d/3 - n/324>" - p � 0,
du* v dM* 
dj3 
= vH*</>' + � (¢ - x¢') dP � 0.
740 
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The greater the efficiency of hunting labor, the sm
aller the equilibrium 
stock of animals. One implication is that larger ani
mals and/or gregarious 
animals that tend to congregate in herds, such
 as mammoth, bison, 
antelope, camels, and llamas (among the extinc
t genera), would have 
comparatively high visibility and low search cos
t, making them easier 
prey and increasing {J. Thus, Edwards (1967, p. 14
9) argues that "human 
technology, including use of missile weapons, greatly
 reduces the counter­
attacking defensive advantages of large size and e
mphasizes concealment 
and speed of flight. At this point . . .  the genet
ically selected optimum 
body size of many forms declines sharply. " Also,
 the introduction of the 
riding horse into the Plains Indians culture by th
e Spanish would have 
had the effect of increasing bison hunting effici
ency and reducing the 
stock of bison. Armed with the horse and the bo
w, the Plains Indians in 
another 200 years could possibly have depleted
 the stock of bison as 
effectively as did Buffalo Bill and the U.S. cavalry
. 
However, changes in hunting efficiency could
 either increase or 
decrease hunting effort and per capita income (d
H* /dfJ � 0, du * /d{J i:; 
0), Greater hunting efficiency could release labor 
for agricultural employ­
ment or so reduce the animal stock that the soc
iety is made poorer. It 
would appear that this was not the effect of t
he horse on the Plains 
Indians, many of whom were uprooted from thei
r agrarian activities but 
who achieved greater affluence as bison hunter
s. This affluence could 
have been a temporary phenomenon; that is, in
 the short run, given the 
animal stock, we have dM*/dfJ = 0 and du*/d{J = vH*c/>' > 0. The 
short-run effect of an increase in hunting efficien
cy is always to increase 
per capita income. 
3. 
dM* 
dv 
(¢')2 < 0,- ---:;;, va'.,,, 
du* _ M*c/> + � (¢ -;;;; - n n 
dH* 
dv 
M*c/>' H* dM* = ·- -- + - --
fivncp" M* dv 
xc/>') � � 0. dv 
� 0, 
The greater the consumption value of the hunted r
esource, the smaller 
will be the equilibrium biomass. Hunting labor and 
per capita income 
could also be smaller depending on how much the 
biomass of animals 
is depleted (if the species becomes extinct, then, obviously, h
unting will 
cease): 
4. 
dM* -- = 0, 
dn 
dH* H* 
-= - - <0, 
dn n 
du* - = -(vM*/n2)(c/> - xc/>') < 0. 
dn 
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In a mixed economy, increasing the human population causes no change 
in the stock of animals but reduces hunting effort and per capita income. 
With constant returns in agriculture, equilibrium requires total hunting 
intensity to be constant. Consequently, any increase in population will be 
offset by a corresponding decrease in each individual's hunting labor. 
This is a very strong empirical implication of the model, for it a_sserts that 
(under our technological assumptions) once a hunting society diversifies 
into agriculture (or gathering), the pressure of increasing population on 
animal stocks disappears. Of course, the moment decreasing returns occur 
in agriculture, this result no longer holds. 
It should be noted that the assumption of a mixed economy is presumed 
not to apply to the Paleo-Indians. For a pure hunter culture we have 
H = L, and the equilibrium animal stock is defined by F(M) 
Mc/>(fJLn/M) = 0. Hence, 
dM 
-- = 
dn 
({JL/M)c/>' < OD 
if D = a' + (fJLn/M2)cp' < 0, which is required for stability. 
5. Institutional and Analytical Aspects of Optimal versus 
Free-Access Hunting 
Economists have long been familiar with the proposition that uncon­
strained nonpriced access to any common-property resource such as a 
fishing or hunting ground (Gordon 1954; Scott 1955; Smith 1968; 
Plourde 197 l )  leads to the inefficient use of such resources. This in­
efficiency takes the form of a reduction of the natural biological stock 
of the resource below the optimal stock required for sustained-yield 
harvesting. The phenomenon can be described as an instance of market 
(or price mechanism) failure after Bator (1958) or of property-right 
failure after Demsetz (1967). It is perhaps more accurately described 
as an instance of incentive failure caused by cultural or institutional 
inadequacies. What fails is the private incentive of the individual to 
harvest (and "conserve" the stock) at socially optimal levels over time. 
In principle, optimality can be achieved by (l) simulating the market 
that has failed, for example, by instituting a user charge-somewhat 
erroneously called a "tax"-for the resource, thereby inducing the 
individual to economize user payments by conserving his use of the 
resource; (2) instituting a property-right system which induces the indi­
vidual to conserve his use of the resource as a means of maximizing 
the return on his property; (3) constraining individual hunting activity 
by social or legal restrictions such as quotas, sharing rules, licensing, or 
prohibitions; and ( 4) limiting the hunting harvest by enculturating 
voluntary conservationist values or behaviour. 
"""==------
742 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
Property rights, social or legal restr1ct1ons on individual harvesting, 
and the enculturation of conservationist behaviour have all been used 
extensively and ingeniously by primitive peoples at one time or another. 
However, the evidence is recent, for theire appears to be no evidence to 
suppose that Paleolithic practices exhibited such sophistication. It is the 
hypothesis of this section that sometime after the extinction of the mega­
fauna, human culture developed a sensitivity to the need to prevent 
overharvesting. Whether man as a superpredator was in fact the principal 
agent in the extinction of the large herbivores and their dependent 
carnivores and scavengers, it is plausible to assume that men saw parallels 
between hunting and the loss of the valued prey, from which arose oral 
and religious traditions, myths, and superstitions which had the effect 
and perhaps the intention of conserving common-property resources. At 
some point the ancestral message became a directive to "take sparingly 
of the bounty of nature."  
Heizer (1955) provides pages of documented examples of  primitive 
strictures on the harvesting of replenishable resources. One of the most 
common techniques was the private ownership of land-fishing holes, 
hunting grounds, nut-bearing trees, and grass seed areas (see Heizer 
[1955, p. 4] for numerous reference summaries on land ownership). 
Constraints on harvesting from common-property lands took many forms. 
Great Lakes Indians stripped only a portion of the fiber off basswood 
trees in order that the wound would heal and the tree live: Vancouver 
Island Indians "never fully strip the bark from a cedar tree lest the tree 
die and its spirit curse the man who peeled the bark and he die also" 
(Heizer 1955, p. 4). The Choctaw had laws regulating the game that 
could be killed by one family, with strict accounting by the captain of 
each band. The Kaska trap marten in a given area only every 2 or 3 
years" The Iroquois spared the females of hunted species during the 
breeding season; the sparing of pregnant females was widespread. The 
Yurok had "game laws" the violation of which would cause loss of 
"hunting luck" (Heizer 1955, pp. 4-5). The Naskapi of Labrador are 
cited as typical of numerous tribes that believe animals and plants were 
created to help man (Heizer 1955, p. 6). In return for killing an animal, 
the hunter must protect it from profane treatment, such as wasting the 
animal or letting dogs gnaw its bones, lest the animal take offense and 
spoil the success of the hunter. Certain species may be hunted by some 
tribes but avoided by others in the belief that the tribe's ancestry traces 
to such species. Many tribes believe that game is watched over by super­
natural authorities who become angry with men if too many deer are 
killed or if they merely wound the animals. (Heizer 1955, p. 7). 
Many more such examples could be cited, but evidence for con­
servationist ethics and institutions (defined as any set of strictures, laws, 
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743 or practices which limit the harvesting of common-property resources) is widespread among primitive peoples in historic or near historic times. Such primitive practices may appear to be exceedingly crude rationing devices. But every efficient price system has its dual equivalent quota system, and modern legislators no less than primitive peoples find it more natural to think in terms of quota restrictions on external effects than interms of prices. 
Among primitive peoples who have invented property-right systems, there are instances of sophistication that would rival the modern property deed. Thus, among the Karok private ownership of a particular fishing ground did not mean owning the land along the river but owning the right to fish a given stretch of the river regardless of who owned the land (Kroeber and Barrett 1960, pp. 3-4). A fishing right might entitle the owner to use the spot every third night and day, with the right transferable by sale or inheritance. Similarly, the right to hunt or share in the hunting of sea lions on a particular rock was owned, and each person on a par­ticular stretch of coast had rights to some cut of a beached whale, with residents of other areas denied such rights except by inheritance or purchase (Kroeber and Barrett 1960, p" 115). The possibility of the existence of property rights or quota regulations governing hunted resources raises the issue of optimal versus free-access harVesting of species. In the following analysis, the assumptions of the previous simple model of production from a common-property hunted resource and an appropriated agricultural resource will be used to state an optimal control model. Primarily, the model will be used to study the conditions for optimal versus free-access species extinction. If 0 is the time preference discount rate assume that instantaneous utility, u = c(t) time, then total welfare for the economy is
lim JT ue-J'dt, 
T-+oo 0 
for an individual and we 
+ vm(t) , is additive over 
to be maximized subject to the production function and resource con­straints and the resource growth equation ( l). Making the substitutions c = y(L - H) and m = (M/n)<fi(x), the current-value Hamilton­Lagrange criterion is (Arrow 1968) 
'11 = y(L - H) + ("�) q, (PZn) + µM[a(M; k) - q, (PZn)] 
to be maximized with respect to the control variable H, where 0 :;; H 5 L. Necessary conditions, according to the maximum princijple, are 
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(< 0, then H = 0, 
if !t = 0, then 0 :;; H :;; L,
> 0, then H = L, 
µ'(t) = oµ 
i'!l/I-
aM' 
M'(t) = M[a(M; k) - <J>(x)], 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
and the transversality conditions 
Jim ,-"µ (t)M ( t) = 0, Jim ,-"µ(t) 
t-+co t-+
co 
Letting � = nµ, condition (8) implies the followin
g: 
></>'�:),then H = 0,
:2: o. 
if-1 - J = </>' (f3Hn) , then 0 :;; H s L, 
v -�) M 
< </>'�:),then H = L. ,I" 
(11) 
Consequently, if we define <Po = </>'(O), �o = (v
 - r/</>0) if <Po > r/v, 
with �o = 0 otherwise, and let the separating b
oundary between a pure 
hunter economy and a hunter
 agrarian economy be �(M) o= v -
r/</>'(f3Ln/M) , then (9) and (10) can be w
ritten8 
�· ( t) 
�[o - F'(M)], if </>o <-'- ,or� > �0;v - � 
�[o - F'(M)] - (v - �) 
x {<1>[<P'c-1i(v � �)] - (v � �) <1>«-ll(v � �)} '
if � (M) s � s �0; 
no - F'(M)] - (v - �i[<P(/3�) - ��) </>'��)} 
if</>' {f3Ln) >-1-,or� < �(M); \ M v - � 
(12a) 
(12b) 
(12c) 
8 These conditions are sufficient as 
well as necessary if 'P is concave in M for giv
en { 
and t and for H set at its maximizing leve
l. Under the assumptions in the t
ext, 'l' is 
concave in M for v ;:::. .; ;:::. 0. 
'1 
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(13a) 
M'(t) 
Ma(M; k), if g > eo; 
M { a(M; k) - </> [</>'c- o c � e)]} ·
if �(M) s e s e0; (13b)
M[a(M; k) - </> (/3�)} if e < e(M). (13c) 
Note that the equality condition in ( I I) reduces to (3) for free-access 
harvesting when � = 0. The e is interpreted as the market value of a 
live unit of the animal stock. Ordinarily we would think of e as being 
nonnegative. A negative value would correspond to animals that are a 
public nuisance requiring a bounty for optimal social control. This value 
is zero to the individual in the absence either of adequate property rights 
in live animals or of harvesting restrictions which impute value to live 
animals. Thus, enculturated limitations on free-access harvesting, such as 
lead hunters to believe they will receive supernatural punishment if they 
harvest too much game, impute a positive value, e, to live animals. One 
does not need to pass judgment on the merits of such devices for social 
control over the chase to appreciate their behavioral (and imputed price) 
effects. 
Since e is the social marginal value of a live animal, the quantity 
v - e in (I I)-( 13) is the net marginal value of a harvested animal. 
Since </> � (/3Hn/ M) </>' for H :;; L is the marginal physical product ofthe biomass of game (biological capital), equations (12b) and (12c) 
require the net marginal value productivity of the game stock, 
(v - e)[ </> - (f3Hn/M)</>'] for H :;; L, to equal net interest on investment 
in a live animal less capital gains, e[o - F'(M)] - e', where the interest
rate, 0 - F'(M), is reckoned net of the biological "own" rate, F'(M). 
The biological rate, F'(M), is analogous to a capital depreciation rate 
when F'(M) < 0 and a capital appreciation rate when F'(M) > 0. 
Equations (12) and (13) provide two first-order autonomous differential 
equations in [e(t) , M(t)] which, together with the transversality con­
ditions and initial conditions, must be satisfied along an optimal bionomic 
development path. Paths satisfying (12) and (13) will be characterized 
by the usual phase diagram representation in (�, M) space. 
In figures 2-4 the set of points E(e) is defined by the condition �'(t) = 0 
in (12) and represents the stationary state asset demand for the animal 
stock. The set of points B(e) is defined by the condition M'(t) = 0 in 
(13) and represents the stationary state asset supply of animals. Properties 
of these functions and the phase diagrams in. figures 2-4 are derived in 
the Appendix. 
Along E ( e) the value of the marginal product of the game stock is 
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equal to interest net of biological growth. Hence, an increase in the 
animal stock reduces biological growth, increases net interest, and reduces 
the price of live animals. Along B( �), the harvest intensity is equal to 
average biological growth. For a mixed economy, increases in the live 
animal price reduce the harvest per unit of biomass and increase the 
game stock. 
An optimal equilibrium path yielding a mixed economy in the station� 
ary state is shown in figure 2. Starting with initial conditions (M, �), it is 
socially desirable for the culture to specialize in hunting. As the game 
stock is depleted and its value rises, optimality requires the economy 
eventually (beginning at P) to begin agricultural production. In long-run 
r 
I 
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equilibrium at (M* * ,  e••i, both hunting and agriculture reach Stahle 
levels of production. Figure 3 illustrates an optimal path for an economy 
that begins as, and remains to the end, a culture of specialized hunters. 
In this case, the free-access economy produces a socially optimal equilib­
rium. 
Agricultural specialization may occur following a period of hunting 
that causes extinction. This is illustrated in figure 4 in which et > e:>, 
where B(eS) = E(e:;) = o. At all prices e � es, the harvest rate 
exceeds the growth rate for every live animal stock, causing extinction. 
At all prices e 2: eQ, interest on investment in animals exceeds the net 
value of the marginal product of live animals for every animal stock. 
Hence, e� � eo implies that, along an optimal development path, the 
�!\'!:� ... 
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economy perpetually consumes capital and must eventually w
ipe out the 
stock of live animals and specialize thereafter in agricult
ure. Along an 
optimal path beginning at (!'1, �) one would at first observe a pure 
hunter culture, then a mixed economy, and ultimately 
an agrarian 
economy. 
The effect of free-access harvesting and its contrast with a
n optimal 
development path are obtained by setting ( = 0 for all t. This condition 
replaces those stated in ( 12) and corresponds to the nonex
istence of a
market in live animals or of any equivalent valuation system for
 expressing 
the opportunity costs of the current harvest. In effect, the "d
emand" for 
biological capital is perfectly elastic at ( = 0. If (t > O, the free-access 
economy eventually harvests to extinction as in figure 4. If et < 0, such 
an economy harvests short of extinction and conserves an
 animal stock 
M* = B(O) > 0 as in figures 2 and 3.
,, § I 
I 
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Figures 2 and 4 apply to "high-impatience" economies, 0 � Ff,. For 
low-impatience economies, 0 < F �' extinction of an animal species will 
never be optimal since the net cost of biological capital (j - F' ( M) -+ 0 
as M -+ M0, making it optimal to stop biological capital consumption 
at M = M0 for all capital prices e � e0• This means that the static asset 
demand for biological capital becomes completely inelastic at M = M,, 
( ;:,,, (0, as illustrated by M = E,( () in figure 3. However, the concept 
of "high" or "low" impatience must be measured relative to the biotic 
growth potential of the hunted species. Using the simple parameterization 
F(M) = kG(M), a relatively high (low) impatience economy is defined 
by i'J/k ;:,,, G0(i'J/k < G0). If F0 = kG0 is finite for any given species, it is 
clear that there always exists a cultural impatience rate, 0, high ienough 
that it may be optimal to harvest the species to extinction. 
6. Comparative Stationary States of Hunting 
For interior solutions 0 < H < L, the effect of the parameters (0, r, v, k) 
on the optimal stationarywstate level M** is obtained by implicit differen­
tiation of the following equations : 
Since 
([i'J - F'(M**)] - (v - ()(</> - x<f>') = 0, (14) 
a(M** ;  k) - <f>(x*) = 0, where x* = <J>-C-l )  (v _' 
(**
) . ( 15) 
Ii - F' + </> - (F" 
D = I ( </>') 2 I < o,- a' </>"(v - () 
we deduce 
dM** (o - F' + <f>)a 
-- = - > 0, 
dk kD 
dM** </>'(Ii - F') + </>'(</> - x<f>')
-- = > 0, 
dr </>"(v - ne)D 
dM** (</>')2 (i'J - F')
-- = < 0dv </>"(v - e)D ' 
dM** 
- = -
d{J 
(</>') 2( < 0. </>"(v - ()D 
The optimal stationary-state animal stock is smaller (and the prospect of 
extinction greater) the lower the biotic potential of the species, the lower 
the efficiency of labor in agriculture relative to hunting, the higher the 
cultural value placed on meat, and the higher the culture's preference 
for present over future consumption. Certain features of the prey stock 
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may affect both r and k. Thus, if larger animals have a lower biotic 
potential and are easier to hunt, this implies lower r and lower k, yielding 
a magnified decrease. in M * *. 
These results and the similar conclusions of Section 4 for free-access 
hunting do not provide any new evidence on the causes of Pleistocene 
extinction. They are offered in an attempt to demonstrate the use of a 
coherent economic framework for the study and evaluation of extinction 
or other hypotheses concerning the primitive hunter culture. 9 It  is hoped 
tbat the framework of this paper will enhance the possibility of a more 
comprehensive evaluation of the limited qualitative cross-cultural, 
chronological, and regional data on hunting-gathering-agricultural 
activities in primitive societies. 
Appendix 
In this Appendix, properties of the differential equations (12) (13) and their 
phase diagram representation will be developed in greater detail. First consider 
( 12) : 
I. From (12a) we have e'(t) ""' 0 according as o - F'(M) ""' 0  for e > e0•
Let o - F'(M) :S 0 for 0 :S M :S M,, and o - F'(M) > 0 for M > M,. 
Then e'(t) :S 0 in the region (e > e0, 0 :S M :S M,), and e'(t) > 0 in 
(� > e0, M > M6).  This is illustrated by the vertical arrow above <!o in figure 2 
for the case in which M6 = 0, that is, J - F'(O) ;;::::: 0. It should be noted that 
�o = 0 in the event that t/>O ::5 r/v, that is, hunting is uneconomical relative to 
agriculture at all hunting intensities even when live animals have zero value. 
This degenerate case leads to agricultural specialization from time zero, which 
must be distinguished from agricultural specialization following the hunting of 
prey to extinction. 
2. From (12b)-(12c), let M = E (e) be defined by the set of points 
[(e, M) I e'(t) = 0, 0 :S e :S e0, M 2: O]. The condition e'(t) = 0 requires 
o - F'(M) = 
(" � e) ( � ( �,,_0 (v � e)] - (v � e) �,,_1, (. � e) )  · 
e(M) :S e :S eo, 
(!Ga) 
(v - e) [ (PLn) (PL•) (PLn) ] -e- � M - M .P' M ' e  < e(M), (16b) 
that is, the net rate of interest must equal the relative value marginal productivity 
of the biomass of prey. The function E(i;) implied by the interior solution (16a) 
is derived graphically in figU.re 5 for two distinguishing cases: ( 1) if F Q ::; 0, the 
curve labeled £((;) is obtained; (2) if FQ > 0, the curve labeled Ed(r!) is the 
result. The curve in quadrant I of figure 5 is the relative value marginal pro­
ductivity of the biomass. Quadrant II shows net interest as a function of the 
biomass of game. For each price of live game ,; such that net interest equals 
9 For example, if the environment was economically more favorable for gathering in 
Africa than it was in North America, then the overkill hypothesis is not inconsistent 
with the greater survival of megafauna in Africa. 
'f"' ' 
l 
! 
i 
I 
RISE OF AGRICULTURE 
6-F'(M) 
•-HMJ n \------ ------------ ( '¥![�-(¢;)�""] 
' \ 
I I I II \ : I I I I I \ I : I I II \ I I I I I I I I 
: 1' -- ----r--- I I I '  1 I I I '\. I I I ' ----1----,-I I '- 6 F:  I I I l I j 
I 
75 1 
M I l I I • { I I I I {0 I {0:5. V I J I I I I I l I I I I ----..--- I I I 6-� I ---+ I ---- -'-- -+-, �,..._ __ 
I ............ ..... I M, I ____. I ....... ..... I I I '..J I 
l I' I I I ....._ I I --�-:-----/ ...... , 
l ', I ', 
I m ' 
------------- '' 
Ill 
',,€(Ml=[•-,/.-( �M'l] 
M 
Fro. 5 
relative value marginal productivity, we associate a biomass M ;;::: 0 in quadrant 
IV. Curve E (c!) or E6(c!) represents economic equilibriwn in the capital market 
where capital gains (losses) vanish. Quadrant IV also illustrates the boundary 
e(M) ;: [v - r/¢/(PLn/M)] separating the interior region e(M) ,,; e :S e0,
representing a mixed hunter-agrarian economy, from the region c; < c;(M), 
representing the specialized hunter' economy. This boundary is monotone in­
creasing, e'(M) = - (r¢"PLn)/[(rf/)2M'] > 0,
with lim e(M) = - oo if Jim �'(x) = 0, and lim e(M) = e0•M -+ O  x -1- 00  M -+ oo  
Some key properties of E(c!) are summarized below. 
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a) At M = 0, if & - FQ � O, then e = <!� :::; <!0 :5 v satisfies (16a). At 
M = M6, if /j - F0 < 0 and o = F'(M6), then I; = 1;0• 
b) lim E- 1 (M) = 0, 
M � "'  
since ,P - (PLn/M) (/ - 0 in ( 16b) while /j - F' > 0. 
c) The function E(<!) is monotone decreasing; that is, differentiating ( 16a) 
and (16b), it can be verified that dM/dl; < 0 and from (12b) and ( 12c) that 
Oc!'(t)/ae > o, <! :::; c;0, as illustrated by the vertical arrows in figure 2.
Now consider (13) : 
1 .  From (13a), M'(t) :;;:: 0 according as 0 < M ;§! !VI, if I; > 1;0 as indicated 
by the horizontal arrows above c!o in figure 2. 
2. From ( 1 3b) and ( 13c), let M = B(I;) be defined by the set of points 
[(/;, M) I M'(t) = 0, I; :;; 1;0, M ;,;  O]. This implies 
a(M; k) 
(" (PZ"
)
. tP (�") '
"
f
pHn ,,,_,, (-'-
) 
i M· = "" v - e , 
"f 
PLn < '"- "  (-' -
)
. '
M - "' v - 1; 
( 17) 
For each c! :5 <!0, this equation provides a corresponding M ;;::: 0. Points on 
M = B(<!) represent biological equilibrium in the prey stock. In figure 6, let 
k = k1, giving the monotone decreasing percentage average rate of biomass 
growth a(M; k1). Since this function is everywhere below the harvest per unit 
of biomass when the economy specializes in hunting, it follows that we have an 
interior maximum 0 < H < L for every e and a corresponding M determined 
by the intersection a(M; k1) = ,P{ .p"-"[r/(v - l;)J}. At I; = e• equilibrium 
is at Q"', while at e = e" < <!"' equilibrium is at Q". For this case the function 
B(I;) will be in the region l;(M) $ I; :;; 1;0 as shown in figure 2. But if k = k2 
the constraining boundary set defined by tfi(PLn/M) intersects a(M; k2) at two 
points corresponding to a biomass M1 and M2 as shown in figure 6. Consequently, 
for any I; such that e, < I; < e,, where M1 = B(/;1), M2 = B(/;2) (e.g., I; = e·
in fig. 6), hunting intensity is constrained at the level PLn/M and the harvest 
intensity is tfa(PLn/M) < a(M; k2), with M'(t) > 0 for all M1 < M < M2• 
Thus, at ei an increase in the stock above M1 reduces harvest intensity by more 
than growth intensity because hunting effort cannot be increased. The stock 
rises until M2 is reached, where the growth rate is depressed to the level of the 
harvest. Hence, equilibrium on M = B(<!), just above <!1, is reached because of 
naturally occurring diminishing returns to biomass growth and cannot be 
influenced by the control H. In figure 3 this means that the function B(l;) intersects 
the boundary .;(M) and is discontinuous at M1 = B(,;"1). This phenomenon is a 
property of labor-scarce economies, since for L large enough B(;') will be entirely 
in the interior set for a mixed economy. 
Some key properties of B(e) in the interior [e(M) < e < 1;0, M ;,; OJ are: 
a) At M = 0, I; =  1;i :;;:: 0 satisfies (17).
b) At M = !VI a(JVI; k) = 0 and I; = 1;0• 
c) The function B(l;) is monotone increasing, that is, from ( 1 7), dM/dl; > 0.
From (13b) and ( 13c), referring to fignres 3 and 6, if: 
i) I; < /;" then (a) M'(t) > 0 if M < B(I;) ; (b) M'(t) < 0 if B(I;) < M <
M1 ; (c) M'(t) > 0 if M1 < M < M2 ; and (d) M'(t) < 0 if M > M,. 
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ii) 1;1 < I; $ I;,, then (a) M'(t) > 0 if M < M2 and (b) M'(t) < 0 if 
M > M2• 
iii) e, < e < e0, then (a) M'(t) > 0 if M < B(I;) and (b) M'(t) ·� 0 if 
M > B(e). Each of these directions of motion is illustrated by the horizontal 
arrows in figure 3. 
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